Audit Redaction

Audit Redaction

Audit Redaction — FinKore specification text, requirements, and related reading.

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Status

FinKore Core 2.0.4 stable.

Purpose

This document defines how sensitive information may be withheld while preserving audit-history integrity.

Terminology

Redaction is the policy-authorized concealment or replacement of protected Audit Event content in a representation of logical history, without pretending the content or event never existed.

Requirements

  • AUDIT-REDACTION-001 — An audit policy MUST identify which content requires redaction and under what authority. Core 2.0 redaction targets are Audit Change paths supplied by the producer and the reserved actor-context targets actor.displayName and actor.metadata.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-002 — A redacted value MUST be distinguishable from a value that was absent originally.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-003 — A redacted representation MUST preserve event identity, event type, entity reference, occurrence timestamp, actor identity, any supplied actor type, and every ordering relationship explicitly recorded in logical history.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-004 — Redaction SHOULD preserve enough structural information to explain what category of content was removed.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-005 — Access-time masking MAY supplement redaction.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-007 — Access-time masking MUST NOT be represented as mutation of the committed source event.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-006 — A redaction action affecting committed logical history MUST produce an Audit Event identifying that the redaction occurred.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-008 — A redaction policy identifier is optional. In the bounded policy representation, policy.id MAY be omitted; when supplied, it MUST be a nonempty string. Supplied null, empty strings and non-string values MUST be rejected with FINKORE_AUDIT_REDACTION_INVALID during policy validation, before candidate evidence validation. An omitted identifier MUST NOT prevent otherwise valid redaction. An identifier MUST NOT substitute for required authority or protected targets, change which content is redacted, or authorize changes to committed history. Rejection MUST leave logical history unchanged under AUDIT-ERROR-001.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-009 — A bounded redaction request MUST supply a top-level, nonempty string sourceEventId that selects exactly one already committed Audit Event in the supplied logical history. Every protected target declared by the policy MUST resolve within that selected Event. An omitted, null, empty, non-string, unknown, or ambiguous sourceEventId, or a protected target absent from the selected Event, MUST fail with FINKORE_AUDIT_REDACTION_INVALID. The request MUST NOT select, combine, or redact content from another Event, and failure MUST leave the complete logical history unchanged.
  • AUDIT-REDACTION-010 — The candidate redaction evidence Event MUST contain an object-valued metadata.redactionEvidence with the selected sourceEventId, the policy authority, and the exact ordered protectedTargets supplied by the policy. It MUST also contain policyId exactly when the policy supplies id, with the same value. The candidate Event's Entity reference MUST match the selected source Event's Entity reference, and the evidence MUST NOT contain a protected source value. Missing, malformed, partial, additional, or mismatched linkage MUST fail with FINKORE_AUDIT_REDACTION_INVALID after intrinsic candidate Event validation. Existing invalid-Event, invalid-Actor, duplicate-event, and Audit Relationship failures retain their existing portable codes and precedence. Rejection MUST leave logical history unchanged.

Invariants

A redacted representation must preserve the fact that an Audit Event occurred and that protected content occupied a defined place in it.

Representation boundary

Identifying authority in AUDIT-REDACTION-001 is required before a redacted representation or redaction evidence is returned. Missing or malformed authority is FINKORE_AUDIT_REDACTION_INVALID; the existence of protected paths alone does not establish authority. The bounded fixture represents that declaration as a nonempty string policy.authority; omitted, null, empty, numeric, Boolean, array, or object values do not satisfy that representation. This does not standardize an authority registry, authenticate the declaration, or introduce RBAC. Other policy fields retain their separately declared contracts. Invalid policy input cannot partially redact committed history or commit a redaction evidence Event.

The optional identifier in AUDIT-REDACTION-008 is an opaque label. It is not looked up, authenticated, normalized or used to select protected content. A nonempty string is preserved as supplied; whitespace or special member names do not acquire identifier semantics. Omission and supplied null are distinct. Native convenience APIs may use a documented absence sentinel; portable parsing must not treat supplied null as omission. Existing history validation precedes policy processing under the existing error priorities.

Core 2.0 redaction is single-source and explicit. Validation proceeds through supplied history, policy, source selection and protected-target resolution, intrinsic candidate evidence validation, then evidence-linkage validation. The selected source remains committed and unchanged; successful observation returns its protected representation and appends one independently valid evidence Event. A repeated authorized request may append another evidence Event with a new event identifier. Reusing an already committed evidence identifier remains FINKORE_AUDIT_DUPLICATE_EVENT.

Redaction linkage is carried by metadata.redactionEvidence; it does not add a REDACTS Audit Relationship type. If a candidate evidence Event separately carries an Audit Relationship, the closed relationship catalog and all existing relationship validation still apply. protectedTargets preserves the policy's ordered target declarations exactly; it does not expose the corresponding protected values.

Core 2.0 defines the meaning of redaction, including optional Actor context under AUDIT-ACTOR-006, without standardizing a production redacted-value encoding. The representation is implementation-defined and must preserve the distinctions and evidence required above. A consumer-owned conformance binding normalizes that representation to the conformance-only {"presence":"REDACTED"} sentinel; the sentinel is not a required production representation.

Example

The following JSON is illustrative and non-normative. The masking representation is application-defined.

{
  "field": "bankAccount",
  "before": { "redacted": true },
  "after": { "redacted": true }
}

Even though neither protected value is disclosed, the separate before and after positions preserve the fact that the field changed.

Invalid Examples

  • Deleting an entire event solely because one field is sensitive.
  • Replacing a value with null when null could have been the original value.

Open Questions

  • How can cryptographic evidence of pre-redaction content be standardized without creating disclosure risk?
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